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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Randi Marvidikis Hales, daughter of the owner of the Appellant
corporation, Hales Sand and Gravel, died July 31,1986. Since her death
occurred in the course of her employment, and since she left no dependents,
the Appellant was ordered to pay $30,000 into the Uninsured Employers' Fund.
The order was entered pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1 -68 (2)(a).
If the commission has made a determination that there are no
dependents of the deceased, it may, prior to the lapse of one year from
the date of death of a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for
the employer or insurance carrier to pay into the Uninsured Employers'
Fund the sum of $30,000. When the amount in the Uninsured
Employers' Fund reaches or exceeds $500,000, the $30,000 shall
thereafter be paid into the Second Injury Fund. If the amount in the
Uninsured Employers' Fund falls below $500,000 at any time after
reaching the initial $500,000, the commission shall direct payments into
either the Second Injury Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund as may
be required so as to maintain the Uninsured Employers' Fund at or near
$500,000. Before payment into either fund, the $30,000 shall be reduced
by the amount of any weekly compensation payments paid to or due the
deceased between the date of the accident and death. If a dependency
claim is filed subsequent to the issuance of such an order and, thereafter,
a determination of dependency is made by the commission, the award
shall first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit to the Uninsured
Employers' Fund or the Second Injury Fund by the employer or
insurance carrier before any further claim may be asserted against the
employer or insurance carrier. If no dependency claim is filed within one
year from the date of death, the commission's temporary order shall
become permanent and final. If no temporary order has been issued and
no claim for dependency has been filed within one year from the date of
death, the commission may issue a permanent order at any time
requiring the carrier or employer to pay $30,000 into the Second Injury
Fund. Any claim for compensation by a dependent must be filed with the
commission within one year from the date of death of the deceased.
This statute provides that an employer or the employer's insurance carrier may
be required to pay $30,000 into the Uninsured Employers' Fund should an
employee die without dependents. The $30,000 becomes a mandatory
payment if the amount in either the Uninsured Employers' Fund or the Second
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Injury Fund falls below $500,000. A statutory funeral allowance of $1,800 is
also required.
The Appellant filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Industrial
Commission challenging the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68
(2)(a). Appellant claimed this statute unduly burdens the corporation and others
similarly situated in that the corporation is required to stand the cost of
insurance coverage for uninsured employers and consequently subsidize his
competitors in the marketplace.
The Industrial Commission denied Appellant's M6tion for Review and
affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge reauiring payment.
Appellant brings this appeal as a result of that affirmation.
Subsequent to these actions, through the efforts of the Appellant, the
legislature repealed the statutory provision under which the payment was
ordered. House Bill No. 208,1987 General Session.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant is required pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2)(a) to
pay $30,000 into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. This requirement stems from
the fact that the daughter of the owner of the Appellant corporation died while
working and left no dependents.
The payment of monies into the Uninsured Employers' Fund constitutes a
"tax". This is a "tax" rather than "compensation" as it is for a public purpose
rather than a payment directly to an employee or his dependents as a result of
the employee's injury or death.
As a tax, this payment is subject to the principles of equal protection. The
tax must operate equally on persons similarly situated and any classifications
must not be arbitrary or adventitious. In this case, the statute is arbitrary and
adventitious in that an employer is subject to pay the $30,000 based on the
fortutious circumstance of whether or not an employee who is killed has
dependents.
The statute is also discriminatory as applied and as such an intentional
and systematic violation of constitutional principles must be shown. Insured
employers are subject to liability twice, once to pay their insurance premiums,
and again to pay $30,000 should an employee die with no dependents.
Uninsured employers, on the other hand, are subject only to the $30,000
liability. This is a particularly harsh application considering Title 35 of the Utah
Code is replete with avenues in which this fund can be supplemented by the
uninsured employee and by which such employer can be forced to obtain the
requisite insurance. The simple fact that insured employers are subject to a
fund that even indirectly benefits uninsured employers is intentional
discrimination.
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The principles of substantive due process are also violated. The purpose
of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2)(a) is to provide monies for those employees
whose employers are not insured. It is irrational and unreasonable to put this
burden equally upon insured and uninsured employers alike. Means are
provided in Title 35 to coerce the payment of insurance premiums and those
because of whom the law has been created must be required to bear the
burden, rather than those who abide the law.
House Bill No. 208 amends the harsh application of Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-68. This amendment is remedial in nature in that it remedies the defects
of the former statute in order to promote rather than deter justice. Because the
amendment is remedial, it must apply retroactively to the Appellant.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I:

A.

PAYMENT INTO THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND IS A
TAX AS OPPOSED TO COMPENSATION AND MUST
THEREFORE ABIDE EQUAL PROTECTION AND SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES
The Payment Ordered Is A Tax As Opposed To Compensation.

A "tax" has been defined as "every charge upon persons or property,
inposed by or under the authority of the legislature for public purposes." See
City of Madera V. Black. 181 Cal. 306, 310, 184 P. 397 (1919). Black's Law
Dictionary. 5th Edition, defines "taxes", as "public burdens imposed generally
upon the inhabitants of the whole state, or upon some civil division thereof, for
governmental purposes, without reference to peculiar benefits to particular
individuals or property."
"Compensation", on the other hand, is defined in Webster's New

International Dictionary as:
That which constitutes or is regarded as, an equivalent or recompense,
that which makes good the lack or variation of something else; that which
compensates for loss or privation; amends, renumeration, recompense.
As an example of "compensation", Webster's Seventh New Collegiate
Dictionary provides that compensation is "payment to an unemployed or injured
worker or his dependents."
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 makes it clear that compensation is a payment
made either to an injured employee or to the dependents of such an employee:
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured, and the
dependents of every such employee who is killed, by accident arising out
of or in the course of his employment,... shall be paid compensation for
loss sustained on account of the injury or death,...
(emphasis added)
Compensation then constitutes a payment directly to an employee or his
dependents which serves as recompense for an injury suffered while on the job.
This is the general sceme of the Worker's Compensation statutes.
6

By contrast, payments made by employers pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§35-1 -68(2)(a) into a special fund created by the Legislature for the welfare of
all workers in general is a tax. The Industrial Commission has sustained no
loss and is not, therefore, compensated for the loss. No employee of the
employer paying into the fund directly is benefited. Rather, the Commission
"taxes" all employers and then uses these monies to provide financial support
for employees when they are injured and their employers carry no insurance.
Such support is provided without placing any additional burden on the injured
employee's employer. Clearly, this constitutes a "public purpose" as it provides
benefits for all workers in general.
That money paid by employers into a fund is the equivalent of a tax has
long been recognized. In Yosemite Lumber Comoanv y. Industrial Accident
Commission. 187 Cal. 774, 782, 783, 204 P. 226, (1922), the Supreme Court of
California found that the paying of money to the State Measurer by an employer
upon the death of an employee with no dependents corlstituted a tax:
Insofar as the act purports to exact from employers a sum to be used by
the state for disabled workmen in general, it is in reality a taxing law, a
revenue measure. It requires any employer to pay to the state a sum of
$350.00 whenever one of his workmen who has no dependents is killed
by an injury received in the course of his employment, and the fund thus
raised is to be used for vocational re-education of workmen not
connected in any way with such employer. ... This is purely a tax.
(emphasis added)
A later California case also concluded that payments into a Subsequent Injuries
Fund where an employee died without dependents was a "tax measure." See
People v. Standard Oil Company. 132 Cal. App. 563, 572, 23 P. 2d 86 (1933).
In Industrial Commissioner v. McCarthy. 295 N.Y. 443, 68 N.E. 2d 434
(1946) the New York Court dealt with a statute which provided that
compensation and death benefits to be paid to an employee or his dependents
would be doubled in amount if the injured dependents or killed employee was
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under eighteen years of age at the time of the accident. In this case, the
employee was a minor and died with no dependents. The employer thereupon
contributed money into a "special fund" pursuant to a Labor Code statute. The
employer defendant alleged that payment to the state rather than to a particular
employee or his dependents was not "compensation." The Court agreed.
New York again looked at the meaning of "compensation" in
Commissioner of Taxation v. Buffalo Standard Foundry. 4 App. Div. 2d 894,
895,167 N.Y. S. 2d 241 (N.Y. 1957). Here, an employer had paid the maximum
amount of compensation required by statute to an employee suffering from a
disease known as "silicosis." When the employee eventually died with no
dependents, the employer paid $2,000.00 into state funds pursuant to another
statute. The employer argued that the second payment into the state fund was
unjustified as he had already paid the maximum amount of "compensation"
required. The Court rejected this argument, stating:
We are pursuaded that payments to special funds mentioned are in a
wholly different category from ordinary awards and not to be considered
as payment of compensation or death benefits in the ordinarily accepted
meaning of these terms.
(emphasis added)
Another New York Court, in upholding an earlier decision where it found that
payments made by the employer or the insurance carrier into a special fund
was not an award of compensation, noted that such payments are not
compensation, but rather "in lieu of an award of compensation." Matter of Martin
v. Wurlitzer. 249 App. Div. 321, 323, 293 N.Y.S. 105 (1937).
Other jurisdictions have similarly found that payments into funds do not
constitute "compensation." In Schmahl v. School District No. 12 of Pine County.
200 Minn. 294, 297, 274 N.W. 168 (1937), an employee of the school district
was killed while working. Pursuant to the Minnesota statute, the school district
was required to pay $200.00 into the "Special Compensation Fund" where the
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employee had no dependents. When the school district failed to pay within 30
days, the State Treasurer applied for a judgment in accordance with a statute
dealing with defaults in the payment of compensation. The Minnesota Supreme
Court upheld the lower court's denial of the treasurer's application, stating:
[T]here has been no award of "compensation" to appellant within the
meaning of this statute. Payments to the Special Compensation Fund
are not compensation to injured employees or their dependents, nor are
they compensation of any kind. They are simply fixed sums which, both
as to amount and obligation to pay, are determined by statute.
(emphasis added)
The interpretation of "compensation" by the Texas courts also supports
the idea that monies paid into funds set up by the Industrial Commission or the
like are not "compensation." In Industrial Accident Board v. Texas Employers
insurance Association. 162 Tex 244, 246, 345 S.W. 2d 718 (1951), the Court
observed:
The Board contends that when it seeks to recover from the Second Injury
Fund, it is not a claimant of compensation under the terms of Section 5,
Article 8307, V.A.C.S. That article provides, among other things, that
when an appeal is taken from the award of the Board to the courts, that
"the burden of proof shall be upon the party claiming compensation." We
agree that the benefits received by the Second Injury Fund are not
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, but are only
payments into the Fund for the benefit of those receiving a second injury
under the terms of the Act.
(emphasis added)
In light of the above discussion, there can be no doubt that payment by
the Appellant of monies into the Uninsured Employers' Fund pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §36-1-68 (2)(a) will constitute satisfaction of a tax obligation rather
than "compensation."
B.

The Imposition Of A Tax Must Abide Equal Protection Principles.

"Equal protection protects against discrimination within a class. The
legislature has considerable discretion in the designation of classifications but
the court must determine whether such classifications operate equally on all
persons similarly situated." State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance.
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576 P. 2d 1297 (Utah 1978). The concept of like treatment for those similarly
situated was treated by the California Supreme Court in In re Gary W. 486 P.2d
1201 (1971):
[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S. nor
the California Constitution (Article I, §§11, 21, Article IV, Section 16)
precludes classification by the Legislature or requires uniform operation
of the law with respect to persons who are different. The State may not,
however, arbitrarily accord privileges to or impose disabilities upon one
class unless some rational distinction between those included and those
excluded from the class exists. T h e concept of the equal protection of
the law compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly
situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like
treatment."
(emphasis added)
In the present case, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2)(a) imposes a tax upon
the employer or his insurance carrier in the event a particular employee dies
without leaving dependents. Should the employee die with dependents, the
employer is not responsible for the payment of the $30,000.00. However, if the
employee dies without dependents, the employer or his insurance carrier must
pay the tax. This is clearly a classification. In State v. Tavlor. 541 P. 2d 1124
(Utah 1978), it was noted that "a state must proceed upon a rational basis, and
may not resort to a classification which is palpably arbitrary."
C.

Classification For Taxation Mav Not Be Arbitrary.

As to taxes in particular, the California Supreme Court in Koenig v.
Johnson. 71 Cal. App. 2d 739, 752,162 P. 2d 746 (1945) stated that:
A tax measure, in order to be valid, must lay its burden uniformly upon all
those who come within a proper classification of the persons to be
subjected to its burden; and such a classification must have some
reasonable basis for a differentiation between those who are and those
who are not to be taxed; it must be founded upon some material, intrinsic
or constitutional distinction, and a purely adventitious condition can form
no reasonable basis for such a classification.
(emphasis added)
The unconstitutionality of tax classifications that are arbitrary or
adventitious has been recognized in numerous cases. In State Tax
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Commission v. Department of Finance. 576 P. 2d 1297 (Utah 1978), the Utah
Supreme Court found that a one percent tax on total premiums directed solely
against the State Insurance Fund was unconstitutional. The Court noted many
similarities between the State Fund and other insurers and found that the only
difference was that the Fund was administered by a State agency. "This feature
is not a rational basis to treat the Fund as a distinct classification." Id. at 1299.
In the instant case, the only difference between employers who must pay
into the fund and those who are not required to do so is that the paying
employer was unfortunate enough to hire an employee who dies without
dependents; hardly a rational basis on which to make a distinct classification.
In John Tennant Memorial Homes v. Citv of Pacify Grove. 27 Cal. App.
3d 372, 379-380,103 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1972), the Court found a city ordinance
which imposed a tax on nonprofit corporations organized for charitable
purposes to be unconstitutional. The tax was aimed at occupants of retirement
homes which were exempted from property taxes. Elderly persons residing in
profit-motivated retirement homes were not required to pay the tax. In finding
that the ordinance denied the plaintiffs equal protection of the laws, the Court
said:
A statute violates the Equal Protection clause if it selects one particular
class of persons for a species of taxation and no rational basis supports
such classification. [Citation.]... [f] The question here, therefore, is what,
if any, substantial differences exist between residents of nonprofit
retirement homes and residents of privately owne^i profit-motivated
retirement facilities, not dedicated to charitable purposes, who are
exempt from the tax ... [ffl It is readily apparent thai there is no possible or
logical difference between an occupant living in a charitable retirement
home and one living in a profit-motivated retirement home that would
justify imposing a tax on the former while exempting the latter.
It is readily apparent in the present case as well that "there is no possible
or logical difference" between an employer whose employee dies without
dependents and an employer whose employee dies with dependents.
11

The case with the most striking parallels to the one at bar is People v.
Yosemite Lumber Company. 191 Cal. 267, 276-277, 216 P. 39 (1923). Here,
the California Supreme Court struck down a statute similar to Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-68 (2)(a) in that it provided that an employer or his insurance carrier
would pay $350.00 to the state treasurer should he have an employee die
without leaving dependents. The statute was held to be in violation of equal
protection principles:
The Act of 1919 having been thus determined to be a tax measure it
must, in order to be valid, be found to conform to the essential purposes
governing taxation. Chief among these essential purposes is that of
uniformity. A tax measure imposing a tax for revenue must, in order to be
valid, lay its burdens uniformly upon all those who come within a proper
classification of the persons to be subjected to the burden of the
particular tax. [Citations.] The class of persons to be subject to the tax in
question are employers. The law, considered as a revenue measure,
must, in order to be valid, bear uniformly, either upon all employers in this
state, or upon some portion of them who may be found to come
reasonably within a narrower classification. The Act of 1919 considered
as such a tax measure, attempts to make such narrower classification by
confining the application of its burden to those employers only whose
workmen killed in the course of employment leave no surviving
dependents. Such a classification, in order to be valid, must have some
reasonable basis for this differentiation. The only basis which is or can
be argued in its support consists of the occasional and purely accidental
circumstance that such employers happen to have such workmen having
no dependents, killed in the course of their employment. // should
require neither argument nor authority to show that such a purely
adventitious condition could form no reasonable basis for the
classification attempted by this Act, particularly in view of the other
provisions thereof, by the terms of which the proceeds of this tax are to be
devoted to the benefit, not of the employers required to pay the tax, nor
even of their employees, but to the benefit and betterment of a class of
persons bearing no relation to either, but who have been injured in other
employment in the general course of industry.
(emphasis added)
A taxation statute which is predicated on the fortuitous circumstance of
whether or not an employee who is killed has dependents has no basis in
reason or justice. Therefore, the statute must be struck down as
unconstitutional and the Appellant must not be required to pay $30,000.00 into
the Uninsured Employers' Fund.
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D.

Classification For Taxation Mav Not Be Discriminatory.

One of the fundamental precepts of Equal Protection is to prevent
discrimination amongst those similarly situated. In other words, "persons
similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different
circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same."
Malan v. Lewis. 693 P. 2d 661, at 669 (Utah 1984). Referring to the Utah
Constitution in particular, Article 1, §24 protects against two types of
discrimination:
First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, the
statutory classifications and the different treatment given the classes must
be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the
objective of the statute.
Id. at 670
A law may not be discriminatory on its face, but may be applied in such a
manner as to violate the principles of equal protection. Discriminatory
application, however, is not found unless it is shown "that there is an intentional
and systematic violation of those constitutional principles, or some designed
effort to violate them, to the injury of the Complainant." thiokol Chemical
Corporation v. Peterson. 393 P. 2d 391 at 396 (Utah 1964).
In the instant case, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2)^a) is not only arbitrary
and capricious in that an employer's liability to the Uninsured Employers' Fund
is based solely on whether or not an employee dies without dependents, but it
is discriminatory as applied as well.
The class in this situation is all business people Within the state who hire
others to work for them. This class, however, is divided once again into those
employers who carry the requisite liability insurance for their employees and
those who do not. Aside from the arbitrary impact of this statute as already
observed, the statute appears to apply evenly to all employers as all employers,
whether they pay insurance or not, are required to pay to the Fund $30,000.00
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should an employee die leaving no dependents. Nonetheless, the very
existence of the Uninsured Employers' Fund reveals that there are those within
the class of employers who are not paying their insurance as required by law.
Because of this, the insured employer must not only pay his insurance, but must
provide support by way of payments into the Fund for employees whose
employers are not insured. The insured employee, therefore, is subject to
double liability, while the uninsured employer is subject to liability under this
statute only if his employee dies with no dependents. Furthermore, the
uninsured employer is directly responsible for the double liability occasioned on
the insured employer. This is obviously treating persons in different
circumstances as if their circumstances were the same. (See Malan v. Lewis^.
If there is to be an Uninsured Employers' Fund, it should be supported by taxing
only the uninsured employer upon the death of an employee with no
dependents, and not the insured employer.
In order to sustain an action for discriminatory application, it must be
shown that the discrimination is intentional and systematic. Intentional does not
mean that a bad motive must be shown, but merely that there has been a
determination to act in a specified way.
Creation of the Uninsured Employers' Fund and Utah Code Ann. §35-168 (2)(a) were set up to provide for the general welfare of employees whose
employers are not insured. That insured employers are also subject to the
statute is intentional discrimination in that there can be no doubt that the insured
employer will have to pay twice if he has an employee die without dependents,
while the uninsured employer is only subject to liability once. In light of this, the
legislature has determined to create the fund and make support thereof
mandatory under the specified conditions. This intentional discrimination
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becomes all the more onerous when other provisions iri Title 35 of the Utah
Code are considered.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-46 (1) provides that all employers, including those
in governmental entities, must insure their employees. Utah Code Ann. §35-146 (2) authorizes the Industrial Commission to bring suit against any employer
who has not provided the requisite insurance. In this instance, a court can even
enjoin the further operation of the employer's business until such time as the
insurance has been procured.
Provisions are also made for direct payment of penalties assessed
against the uninsured employer into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-46.10 (1) provides that:
The commission may also impose, at the time of the hearing, a penalty
against the employer of not more than one and one-half times the
amount of the premium the employer would have paid for worker's
compensation insurance had that employer been insured by the State
Insurance Fund during the period of noncompliance. This penalty shall
be deposited in the Uninsured Employers' Fund created by Section 35-1107 and used for the purposes of that fund.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1 -46.30 (1) further provides that all fines, funds, or
penalties collected from or assessed against the uninsured employer shall be
deposited in the Uninsured Employers' Fund.
In order that the Commission may know which employers have obtained
insurance, and therefore by reason of deduction those who have not, insurance
carriers writing workmen's compensation insurance coverage must notify the
Commission. Failure to do so will result in a fine that alsb is deposited in the
Uninsured Employers' Fund. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-47 (1) and (2).
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-57 makes uninsured employers liable in a civil
action for any injury received by an employee, as an alternative to
reimbursement for the injury by way of the Uninsured Employers' Fund.
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Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2)(a) purposts to apply equally to all within the
class of employers. However, as to the sub-classes included within the class of
employers, namely the insured and the uninsured, application of the law has
resulted in different treatment. Insured employers must pay once to insure their
employees and once again into a fund established to reimburse employees of
uninsured employers if an employee dies without dependents. Uninsured
employers pay only once into the fund if an employee dies without dependents.
Such treatment is not necessary to further the objectives of the statute
and, furthermore, the statute would not be necessary if the Industrial
Commission took the time and effort to enforce the aforementioned provisions of
Title 35. Uninsured employers need be the only ones who pay into the
Uninsured Employers' Fund as it is their avoidance of the law that necessitates
such a fund. Title 35 is replete with methods for making sure all employers
obtain insurance and for collecting fines and penalties to subsidize the
Uninsured Employers' Fund. Therefore, application of Utah Code Ann. §35-168 (2)(a) is an intentional and systematic discrimination that must be remedied.
E.

The Application of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68 (2)(a) To
Appellant Is Violative Of Substantive Due Process Principles.

"Substantive due process... deals with protection from arbitrary
legislative action, even though the person whom it is thought to deprive of life,
liberty or property is afforded the fairest of procedural safeguards. In
substantive law such deprivation is supportable only if the conduct from which
the deprivation flows is prescribed by reasonable legislation reasonably
applied, ie. the law must not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, but must
have a real and substantial relation to the objects sought to be obtained. "Gray
v. Whitmore. 17 Cal. App 3d 1, 21, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971); Russell v. Carleson.
36 Cal. App. 3d 334, 342-343, 111 Cal. Rptr 497 (1974).
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As has been demonstrated above, application of Utah Code Ann. §35-168 (2)(a) to Appellant and others similarly situated is completely arbitrary in that
the ultimate responsibility for the tax depends upon the existence or
nonexistence of relatives of the victim. This statute is also unreasonable in that
its effect is to intentionally discriminate against the class of insured employers
by making them pay into a fund created as a result of employers who do not pay
their insurance. There would be no need for the fund or at least a lesser need if
the Industrial Commission would enforce the provisions provided in Title 35.
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POINT II:

UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1 -68 HAS BEEN AMENDED AND AS
SUCH SHOULD APPLY TO APPELLANT AS THE AMENDMENT
IS REMEDIAL IN NATURE

The general rule is that statutes are construed as prospective only.
However, remedial statutes are generally held to operate retrospectively so
long as they do not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy vested or contractual
rights. Remedial statutes relate only to remedies or modes of procedure. See
82 C.J.S. Statutes §416 (1984).
Legislation that has been regarded as "remedial" in nature includes:
[Statutes which abridge superfluities of former laws, remedying defects
therein, or mischiefs thereof, implying an intention to reform or extend
existing rights, and having for their purpose the promotion of justice and
the advancement of public welfare and of important and beneficial public
objects, such as the protection of the health, morals, and safety of society,
or of the public generally. In re Brown's Estate. 215 P. 2d 203
(Kan. 1950)
The Tax Law is regarded as "remedial" and it has been found that "the
statute authorizing court to correct illegalities, irregularities or errors in tax
assessment is "remedial" and should be liberally construed to accomplish its
objective." Duke Power Company v. Hillsborough Tp.. 26 A. 2d 713, 724 (N.J.
Misc. 1942).
Workmen's Compensation acts are also considered remedial in
character and the provisions of these acts "should be construed broadly and
liberally in order to effectuate their purpose which among other things is to
benefit the working man." Nelson v. Department of Labor and Industries. 115 P.
2d 1014, 1017 (Wash. 1941).
In the instant case, House Bill No. 208 was signed into law by the
Governor on March 16,1987. This Bill eliminates the payment of death benefits
to the Uninsured Employers' Fund when an employee dies with no dependents.
It further provides for additional sources of monies for this Fund.
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This statute is remedial in character in that it does not destroy any vested
or contractual rights. An employer whose employee died without dependents
made no contract with the Industrial Commission to pay $30,000.00 into the
Uninsured Employers' Fund. Neither was such a right vested in the
Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2)(&). Rather, as has been
argued above, the imposition of this amount upon the employer constitutes a tax
and as such is remedial.
The remedial nature of House Bill No. 208 is also evident in its purpose.
Here, the Legislature is abridging the superfluities of the former law and
remedying the defects and mischiefs therein by eliminating an unconstitutional
provision that required employers to pay into a fund based on the fortuitous fact
that an employee has died with no dependents. The Legislature is also
remedying the unconstitutional application of the statute; in providing for
additional sources of revenue for the Uninsured Employers' Fund rather than
imposing double liability on those employers who are insured.
House Bill No. 208 specifically states that it is "an act relating to
Workmen's Compensation"; (See Addendum). As sucr^, the Act is remedial
and must, therefore, "be construed broadly and liberally in order to effectuate
[its] purpose..." Nelson at 1017. The purpose is to correct the injustice wrought
by Utah Code Ann. §35-1 -68 (2)(a). This will not be accomplished by a
prospective application alone. "The promotion of justic© and the advancement
of public welfare" demand that this remedial act be applied retroactively,
particularly in light of the obvious and inherent unconstitutionality of the former
statute. Any other application would only serve to inflate an already gross
injustice, surely not the intent of the Legislature.
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CONCLUSION
A statute requiring an employer to pay a $30,000 death benefit when the
employee has no dependents to benefit thereby is incongruous and
indefensible under principles of equal protection and substantive due process.
The Statute does nothing to serve the purpose of governing relations between
an employer and hjs. employee. In recognition of this irrationality, the legislature
has repealed the statute.
By this particular case, the improper statute creates a particularly tragic
result. The employer suffers not only the loss of his daughter but is penalized
$30,000 which must be paid to the State, not her heirs, because she died so
young as to have no dependents. This unconscionable result cannot stand.
The award must be overturned.
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(UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND AMENDMENTS)

6
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7
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GENERAL SESSION
H . B . No. 208

By

Franklin W. Knowlton

9
0
.1

AN ACT RELATING TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION; ELIMINATING

PAYMENT

.2

BENEFITS

.3

DEPENDENTS; PROVIDING ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR THE

l4

EMPLOYERS'

[5 *

EFFECTIVE DATE.

O F DEATH

TO THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS* FUND WHEN A DECEDENT LEAVES NO

FUND;

MAKING

TECHNICAL

CORRECTIONS;

UNINSURED

AND PROVIDING AN

L6

THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
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AMENDS:

18

31A-3-201, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS 204 AND 211 [ LAWS OF UTAH 1986

L9

35-1-68,

AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 211, LAWS OF UTAH 1986

>0

35-1-71,

AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 138, LAWS OF UTAH 1979

»1

35-1-107, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 211, LAWS OF UTAH 1986

12
23
>4
25

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utaft:
Section 1. Section 31A-3-201, Utah
amended

Code

Annotated

1953,

as last

by Chapters 204 and 211, Laws of Utah 1986^ is amended to read:

31A-3-201.

(1) Except

for annuity

considerations,

insurance

26

premiums paid by institutions within the state system of higher education

27

as specified

23

admitted insurer shall pay to the State Tax Commissibn for deposit in the

in Section

53-48-3,

and ocean

marine insurance, every

01-31-87 5:35 PM ana

General Fund, on or before March 31 in each year, a tax of 2-1/42 of
total

premiums

received

insurance covering
subsection

does

by

it during the preceding calendar year from

property
not

the

or

risks

located

in

this

state.

This

apply to workers1 compensation and title insurance

premiums, which are taxed under Subsections (2) and

(3).

The

taxable

premium under this subsection shall be reduced by:
(a) all

premiums

returned

or

credited to policyholders on direct

business subject to tax in this state;
(b) all premiums received

for

reinsurance

of

property

or

risks

located in this state; and
(c)

the

dividends,

including

within the year, paid or credited
applied

in

abatement

premium
to

reduction benefits maturing

policyholders

in

this

state

or

or reduction of premiums due during the preceding

calendar year.
(2) [4a*)] Every

admitted

insurer

writing

workers1

compensation

insurance in this state, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah
under

Chapter

3,, Title 35, shall pay to the State Tax Commission, on or

before March 31 in each year, a tax of between 3-1/4Z and 3-3/4Z
total

premiums

received

by

year

the

it from workers' compensation insurance in

this state during the preceding calendar year.
applicable in any given

of

shall

be

The percentage of premium

determined

by

the

Industrial

Commission at least 90 days prior to the payment date, and any percentage
of premium over 3-1/4% shall reflect the reasonable reserves necessary to
maintain

the

Uninsured Employers' Fund provided for in Section 35-1-107

-2-
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in ao actuarily sound financial condition.

This taxable premium shall be

reduced in the same manner as provided in Subsections

(1)

(a)

and

(1)

(b), but not as provided in Subsection (1) (c). The Stite Tax Commission
shall

remit from the tax collected under this subsection an amount equal

to 3Z of the premium to the Second Injury Fund created
35-1-68

(1),

under

Subsection

1/AZ of the premium to the General Fund, and any remaining

applicable percentage of the premium to
created

under

Section

35-1-107•

the

Uninsured

Employers'

Fund

No tax that is to b^ transferred into

the General Fund may be collected on premiums received from

Utah

public

agencies.
[£b}—Effectire-duiy-i7-i98?T-the-varTabi>e-tax-proTT|ded-in-SubsectTon
^2^-ia^-shai5:-be-repiaced-by-a-fi:ar-tax-of-3-i/42T]
(3)

Every

admitted

insurer

writing

title insurance in this state

shall pay to the State Tax Commission, on or
year,

a

before

Match

31

in

each

tax of .45Z of the total premium received by either the insurer

or by its agents during the preceding calendar year from title
concerning

property

"premium" includes the

located

in

charges

this
made

state.
to

an

insurance

In calculating this tax,
insured

under

or

to

an

applicant for a policy or contract of title insurance for;
(a)

the

assumption by the title insurer of the risks assumed by the

issuance of the policy or contract of title insurance; and
(b)

abstracting

determining

the

title,

title

insurability

of

searching,

examining

title,

every

and

title,

<j>ther

exclusive of escrow, settlement, or closing charges, whether

or

activity,
denominated

cxs H. B. No. 208
1

premium

2

insurer, a title insurance agent, or any of them.

3

or
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(4)

otherwise,

made

by

a

title

insurer, an agent of a title

Beginning July 1, 1 9 8 6 , former county m u t u a l s and former

4

benefit associations shall pay the premium tax d u e

5

All

6

d e t e r m i n i n g this tax.

7

premiums

received

after

July

1,

1 9 8 6 , shall

( 5 ) T h e following insurers a r e not subject to

8

health

care

insurance

9

Subsection (1):

which

would

otherwise

J)

(a)

insurers licensed under Chapter 5;

L1

(b)

insurers licensed under Chapter 7;

L2

( c ) insurers licensed under Chapter 8;

L3

(d)

insurers licensed under Chapter 9;

L4

(e)

insurers licensed under Chapter 1 1 ;

L5

(f)

insurers licensed under Chapter 1 3 ; a n d

L6

(g)

insurers licensed under Chapter 1 4 .

L7

(-6) N o

L8

[artxficarry]

19

purposes

20

policies.

Zl
22
23
24

of

insurer

issuing

artificially
reducing

Section 2 .

Section

the

multiple

under

policies

be

the
be

to

this

mutual

chapter.

c o n s i d e r e d in

premium

tax on

applicable

an

under

insured

may

allocate the premiums among the p o l i c i e s for
aggregate

35-1-68,

Utah

premium

Code

tax

applicable

Annotated

to

the

1 9 5 3 , as last

amended by Chapter 211, Laws of Utah 1986, is amended to read:
35-1-68.

( 1 ) There is created a Second Injury Fund for the p u r p o s e

of making payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2 .

-4-
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to

all
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monies

heretofore

held in that fund designated as the

"Special Fund" or the "Combined Injury Fund" and

whenever

reference

is

made elsewhere in this code to the "Special Fund" or the "Combined Injury
Fund"

that

reference

shall

be deemed to be to the Second Injury Fund.

I
The state treasurer shall be the custodian of the Second Injury Fund
the

and

commission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable administration

assistance may be paid from the proceeds
general

shall

appoint

a

member

of

of

that

fund.

The

attorney

his staff to represent the Second

Injury Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims Against it.
(2)

If injury causes death within the period of six years

from

the

1
date

of

the

accident,

the employer or insurance carrier s h a l l pay the

b u r i a l expenses of the deceased

as

provided

in

Sectioi^

35-1-81,

and

f u r t h e r b e n e f i t s in the amounts and to the persons as f o l l o w s :
[$z$—if—the—commission—hes-made-a-determiRatioR-that-there--are--no
dependents-or-the-deceased7-it-may7-prior-tc-a-iapse-of-ont-year-from-the
iate~of-death-c£-a-deceased-empioyee7-issT3e-a—temporary—irder—for—the
•apioyer—or—insarance-carrier-to-pay-into-the-Uninscrec-fppxoTers—Fnnd
I
:he-sora-cf-$367606T—When-the-amount-in—the—Bninsured—Enjpioyers--—Fend
'caches—or—exceeds—$586766e7-the-$3676e6-shaxi-thereafte|r-be-paid-into
he-Scconc-xnjury-rnndT—if-the-amount-in-the-Bninsurec—Embioyers-—Fnnd
arrs-beiow-$5e879ee-at-an7-trme-after-reachrng-the-rnTtTaii-$58e7Bee7-the
Draaission—shaix—direct—paymcnts-intc-either-tfae-Seconc-xn^cry-Fcnd-or
ie~Hninscrec-5mproyers"Fand-as-may--be-reqt:ired-so--as—tc—[maintain—the
linsnrec—Employers 1 —Fund—at—or—near—$5867096T—Beforehpayment-into
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e i t h e r - f o n d 7 - t h e - $ 3 8 7 8 8 8 - s h a i i - be-redaced-by-the—amoant—of—any—weekly
compensation-payments-paid-to-or-doe-the-deceased-between-the-date-of-the
accident—and—deathr-—if—a-dependency-ciaim-is-fiied-sobseqoent-to-the
issaance-of-soch-an-order-and7-thereafter7-a-determination-of—dependency
is--made--by-the-commission7-the-award-shaii-first-be-paid-oot-of-the-som
deposited~for-credit-to-the—Hninsored—Empioyers-—Fond—or—the—Second
in^cry-Fand-by-the-empioyer-or-insorance-carrier-before-any-forther-ciaim
may—be—asserted—against—the—empioyer—or—insurance—carrierr—if-no
dependency-ciaim-is-fiied-within-one-year-from-the—date—of—death-—the
eommission-s—temporary—order—shaii—become-permanent-and-finair—if-no
temporary-order-has-been-issned-and-no—ciaim—for—dependency—has—been
Fiied—within-one-year-from-the-date-of-death7-the-commission-may-issne-a
permanent-order-at-any-time-requiring-the—carrier—or—empioyer—to—pay
5367866—into—the—Second—in^ury-Fondr—Any-ciaim-for-compensation-by-a
dependent-most-bc-fiied-with-the-commission-within-one-year-from-the-date
of-death-or-the-rieceesedT]
[{b-)3 (a) ( i )
the

death,

the

If there are wholly dependent persons at the
payment

by

not

more

of

the employer or insurance c a r r i e r s h a l l be

66-2/3% of the decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the
but

time

injury,

than a maximum of 85% of the s t a t e average weekly wage at

the time of the injury per week and not l e s s than a minimum

of

$45

per

week plus §5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor c h i l d
under

the

age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor

children not to exceed the average weekly wage of

the

employee

at

the

eco H. B. No. 208

time

of

the
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injury,

but not to exceed 85Z of the state average weekly

wage at the time of the injury per week, to
for

continue

during

dependency

the remainder of the period between the date of tne death and not to

exceed six years or 312 weeks after the date of the ir^ury.
(ii)

The

dependency

weekly

payment

following

the

to

wholly

expiration

of

dependent

persons

during

the

six-year

period

first

described in Subsection (2) [4b}3 (a) (i) shall be an amount equal to the
weekly benefits paid
initial

six-year

to

those

period,

wholly

reduced

by

dependent

perjsons

during

that

50Z of any weekly federal Social

Security death benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons.
(iii)

The issue of dependency shall be

commission

at

thereafter.

the

end

of

the

initial

subject
six-year

to

review

by

the

period and annually

If in any such review it is determined that, under the facts
l

and circumstances existing at that time, the applicant

is

no

longer

a

wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered a partly
dependent or nondependent person and shall be paid such
benefits as the
commission may determine [pur5nant—to] under Subsect

:kon (2) [*c*] (b)
(ii).
(iv)

For purposes

of

any

dependency

determination,

a

surviving

spouse of a deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly
dependent

for

a six-year period from the date of death of the employee.

This presumption shall not apply after the initial six-ydar
in

determining

period

and,

the then existing annual income of the surviving spouse,

the commission shall exclude 50Z of any

federal

benefits received by that surviving spouse.

-7-
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(b) (i)

If

there are partly dependent persons at the time of

the death, the payment shall be 66-2/31 of the decedent's average
wages

at

the

weekly

time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85Z of

the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and
less

than

a

not

minimum of $45 per week, to continue during dependency for

the remainder of the period between the date of death and not

to

exceed

six years or 312 weeks after the date of injury as the commission in each
case

may

determine

$30,000.
keeping

and

shall

The benefits provided
with

not
for

amount
in

to

this

more than a maximum of

subsection

shall

(ii)

in

the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at

the date of injury, and any amount awarded by the commission
subsection

be

under

this

must be consistent with the general provisions of this title.
Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent [pursuant

to] under Subsection (2) [$b$]

(a)

(iii)

shall

be

determined

by

the

commission in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency
existing at the time of the dependency review and may be paid in a weekly
amount not exceeding the maximum weekly rate that partly dependent person
would receive if wholly dependent.
(iii)

Payments

under

this

section

shall

be paid to such persons

during their dependency by the employer or insurance carrier.
[£d}] (c)
dependent

dependent

persons

and

also

partly

persons at the time of death, the commission may apportion the

benefits as it
benefits

If there are wholly

deems

awarded

to

just

and

equitable;

provided,

that

the

total

all parties concerned shall not exceed the maximum

provided for by law.
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[£e}] ( d ) If there are wholly or partly

dependent

persons

PM

coa

at the

2

time

3

its insurance carrier to said dependents, prior

4

dependency, including any remarriage settlement, does not exceed $30,000,

5

the employer

6

the amount paid and $30,000 into the Second Injury pund provided

7

Subsection (1).

8
9
10
11
12

of death and the total amount of the awards paid by the employer or
to the termination

or its insurance carrier shall pay the difference between

Section 3 .

for in

Section 35-1-71, as last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of

Utah 1979, is amended to read:
35-1-71.

The following persons

shall

be presumed

to be

wholly

dependent for support upon a deceased employee:
(1) Children

under

the age of [eighteen] 1Q y e a r s x or over [snch

13

«S«T3

14

parent,

15

parent, or w h o is legally bound for their support.

16

of

^ physically or mentally
with

whom

they

incapacitated

are living

and I dependent

at the tim^ of the death of such

(2) For purposes of payments to be made under SJubsection

[{2*HbHH

17

of—section]

18

presumed to be wholly dependent upon a spouse with wpom h e or she lived

19

at the time of the employee's death.

i0

35-1-68

upon the

(2) (a) ( i ) , a surviving husband or wife shall be

In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part,

21

shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular

12

existing

at the time of the injury or death of such employee, except for

>3

purposes

of dependency

!4

USHbHiii?—or—section]

reviews
35-1-68

[pcrsnant

to]

(2) (a) (iii)J

under

case

Subsection

No person shall be

a s H. B. No, 208
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1

considered as a dependent unless he or she is a member of the

2

the

3

descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister*

4

this

5

prior to the injury.

6

the words "brother or sister" as above used.

7
8

deceased

family

of

employee, or bears the relation of husband or wife, lineal
The word "child" as used

in

title shall include a posthumous child, and a child legally adopted

Section 4.

Half brothers and half sisters shall be included in

Section 35-1-107,

Utah

Code

Annotated

1953,

as

last

amended by Chapter 211, Laws of Utah 1986, is amended to read:

9

35-1-107.

(1)

There

is

created an Uninsured Employers' Fund for

the purpose of paying and

11

compensation benefits when every employer of the claimant who is found to

12

be

13

appoints or

14

sufficient

15

workers' compensation liabilities under this chapter.

16

to all monies previously held in

17

becomes necessary to pay benefits, the fund is liable for all obligations

18

of

19

exception of penalties on those obligations.

individually,

the

has

assuring,

jointly,
appointed

funds,

employer

to

persons

entitled

workers 1

10

or severally liable becomes or is insolvent,
a

receiver,

or

otherwise

insurance,

sureties,

or

other

as

set

to

the

Default

does

not

have

to

cover

security

This fund succeeds

Indemnity

Fund.

If

it

forth in Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35, with the

>

20

(2)

Funds for

the

Uninsured

Employers1

Fund

shall

be

provided

21

[pursuant—to-SubsectTons-SS-i-fce-fS^—fa^-and] under Subsection 31A-3-201

22

(2)*

The state treasurer is the custodian of

23

Fund

and the commission shall direct its distribution.

24

of administration may be paid from the fund.

-10-

the

Uninsured

Employers'

Reasonable costs

The commission shall employ
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counsel to represent the Uninsured Employers'
brought

Fund

in

ail

proceedings

to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund, and upon the

request of the commission, the attorney general, city attorney, or county
attorney of the locality in which any investigation,
under

the

nearing,

or

trial

provisions of this title is pending, or in which the employee

resides or an employer resides or is doing business,

^hall

aid

in

the'

representation of the fund.
(3)

To

the

extent

of

the compensation and oth^r benefits paid or

payable to or on behalf of an
Uninsured

employee

or

their

dependents

from

the

Employers' Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has all the rights,

powers, and benefits of the employee

or

their

dependents

against

the

employer failing to make the compensation payments.
(4)

The

receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an

insolvent employer is bound by settlements of covered ^laims by the fund.
The court having jurisdiction shall grant all payments
section

a

priority

unoer

tms

equal to that to which the claimint would have been

entitled in the absence
insolvent employer.

maoe

of

this

section

against

tne

assets

of

the

Tne expenses of the fund in handling claims shall be

accorded the same priority as the liquidatorfs expenses.
(5)

The

commission

shall

periodically

trustee, or liquidator of the insolvent
statements

of

the

covered

claims

file

employer

paid

by

w}th
or

the

receiver,

insurance

the ruijic and estimates of

anticipated claims against the fund which shall preserve

the

rignts

the fund for claims against the assets of the insolvent employer.

-i ^ -

carrier

of

BCB H. B. No. 208

(6) When
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any injury or death for which compensation is payable from

the Uninsured Employers1 Fund has been caused
neglect

of

another

by

the

wrongful

act

or

person not in the same employment, the fund has the

same rights as allowed under Section 35-1-62.
(7) The fund, subject

to

approval

the Workers1

of

Compensation

Division of the Industrial Commission, shall discharge its obligations by
adjusting

its

own

claims

or by contracting with an adjusting company,

risk management company, insurance company, or

other

company

that

has

and capabilities in adjusting and paying workers1 compensation

expertise
claims.
(8)

For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the

rendering

a

decision

commission,

upon

with respect to any claim for benefits under this

chapter, shall impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 152
the

value

of

the

total

award in connection with the claim, and shall

direct that the additional penalty be paid into the Uninsured
Fund.

of

Employers'

Award? may be docketed as other awards under this chapter.

(9) The

liability

of the state, the Industrial Commission, and the

state treasurer, with respect to payment of
expenses,

any

compensation

benefits,

fees, or disbursement properly chargeable against the fund, is

limited to the assets in the fund, and they are not otherwise in any

way

liable for the making of any payment.
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules for the processing and
payment of claims for compensation from the fund.
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1

(11)

In

the event it becomes necessary for th^ Uninsured Employers'

2

Fund to pay benefits [pnrsnant-to-the-provisTons-ofJ under

3

to

4

Employers1 Fund may

5

necessary

6

insolvency, (b) the expenses of handling covered cl4ims subsequent to

7

insolvency,

8

other expenses authorized by

9

self-insured

any

employee

to

of

pay

(c)

an

section

insolvent self-insured employer, the Uninsured

assess
(a)

this

all

the

other

self-insured

obligations

of

the

employers

amounts

fund subsequent to an
an

the cost of examinations under Subsection (12), and (d)
this

section.

The

assessments

of

each

employer shall be in the proportion that the manual premium

10

of the self-insured employer for the preceding calendar year bears to the

11

manual premium of all self-insured employers for th^

12

year.

Each self-insured employer shall be notified of his assessment not

13

later

than

14

assessed in any year an amount

15

employer's

16

maximum assessment does not provide in any one year an amount

17

to

18

self-insured employers, the unpaid portion shall be paid as soon as funds

19

become available.

20

section

21

employer's

voluntary

22

privileges

within

23

made

24

occurred prior to July 1, 1986.

make

30

days

manual

all

for

premium

No self-insured employer may be

greater

than

the

preceding

for

calendar

2Z

bf

that

self-insured

calendar

year.

If the

sufficient

necessary payments from the fund for one or more insolvent

a

against

before it is due.

preceding

All

self-insured

period

an

employers

ari

liable

under

this

not to exceed three years after the self-insured
or

involuntary

this state.
insolvent

termination

self-insurance

This subsection do^s not apply to claims

self-insured

-13-

of

employer

if

the

insolvency
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(12)

It

is

01-31-5/ >:J:> rn » H

the

duty

of

all self-insured employers to notify the

!

Industrial Commission of any information indicating that any self-insured

J

employer may be insolvent or in a financial condition

4

employees or the public.

5

cause

6

that self-insured

employer.

7

assessed

all

8

(11). The results of the examination shall be kept confidential.

9

appearing,

against

Section 5*

the

hazardous

to

its

Upon receipt of that notification and with good
Industrial Commission may order an examination of
The

self-insured

cost

of

the

examination

be

employers as provided in Subsection

This act takes effect on July 1, 1987.
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STATUTES
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.--Every
employee mentioned in §35-1-43 who is injured, and the dependents of every
such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of or in the course of his
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely
self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the
injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and
medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided
in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical,
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided
under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on
the employee.
35-1-46 (1) and (2). Employers to secure workers' compensation
benefits for employees - Methods - Failure - Notice - Injunction Violation. (1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns, and school
districts, shall secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits for their
employees:
(a) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation
with the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments shall
commence within 90 days after any final award by the commission;
(b) by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation
with any stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the
business of workers' compensation insurance in this state, which payments
shall commence within 90 days after any final award by the commission;
(c) by furnishing annually to the commission satisfactory proof of
financial ability to pay direct compensation in the amount, in the manner, and
when due as provided for in this title, which payments shall commence within
90 days after any final award by the commission. In these cases the
commission may in its discretion require the deposit of acceptable security,
indemnity, or bond to secure the payment of compensation liabilities as they are
incurred, and may at any time change or modify its findings of fact herein
provided for, if in its judgment this action is necessary or desirable to secure or
assure a strict compliance with all the provisions of law relating to the payment
of compensation and the furnishing of medical, nurse, and hospital services,
medicines, and burial expenses to injured employees and to the dependents of
killed employees. The commission may in proper cases revoke any employer's
privilege as a self-insurer.
(2) The commission is authorized and empowered to maintain a suit in
any court of the state to enjoin any employer, within the provisions of this act,
from further operation of the employer's business, where the employer has
failed to provide for the payment of benefits in one of the three ways in this
section provided. Upon a showing of failure to so provide, the court shall enjoin
the further operation of the employer's business until the payment of these
benefits has been secured by the employer as required by this section. The
court may enjoin the employer without requiring bond from the commission.

If the commission has reason to believe that an employer of one or more
employees is conducting a business without securing the payment of
compensation in one of the three ways provided in this section, the commission
may give such employer five days' written notice by registered mail of such
noncompliance and if the employer within said period does not remedy such
default, the commission may file suit as in this section above provided and the
court is empowered, ex parte to issue without bond a temporary injunction
restraining the further operation of the employer's business.
35-1-46.10. Notice of noncompliance to employer - Enforcement
power of commission - Penalty - Procedure.
(1) In addition to the remedies specified in §35-1-46, if the commission
has reason to believe that an employer of one or more employees is conducting
business without securing the payment of benefits in one of the three ways
provided in §35-1-6, the commission may give that employer written notice of
the noncompliance by certified mail to the last known address of the employer,
and if the employer does not remedy the default within 15 days after delivery of
this notice, the commission may issue an order requiring the employer to
appear before the commission and show cause why the employer should not
be ordered to comply with the provisions of §35-1-46. If it is found that the
employer has failed to provide for the payment of benefits in one of the three
ways provided in §35-1-46, the commission is authorized and empowered to
order any employer to comply with the provisions of §35-1 -46. The commission
may also impose, at the time of the hearing, a penalty against the employer of
not more than one and one-half times the amount of the premium the employer
would have paid for worker's compensation insurance had that employer been
insured by the State Insurance Fund during the period of noncompliance. This
penalty shall be deposited in the Uninsured Employers' Fund created by
Section 35-1-107 and used for the purposes of that fund.
35-1-46.30. Employer's penalty for violation - Notice of
noncompliance - Proof required - Admissible evidence - Criminal
prosecution.
(1) Any employer who fails to comply, and every officer of a corporation
or association which fails to comply, with the provisions of §35-1-46 is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor. Each day's failure to comply is a separate offense. All
funds, fines, or penalties collected or assessed shall be deposited in the
Uninsured Employers' Fund created by §35-1-107 and used for the purposes of
that fund. If the commission has sent written notice of noncompliance by
registered mail to the last known address of the employer, corporation, or
officers of a corporation or association, and the employer, corporation, or
officers do not within ten days provide to the commission proof of compliance,
the notice and failure to provide proof constitutes prima facie evidence that the
employer, corporation, or officers were in violation of this section.

35-1-47 (1) and (2). Notification of workers' compensation
insurance coverage to Industrial Commission - Cancellation
requirements - Penalty for violation.
(1) Every insurance carrier writing workers' compensation insurance
coverage in this state or for this state, regardless of the state in which the policy
is written, shall file notification of that coverage with the Industrial Commission
or its designee within 30 days after the inception date of the policy on forms
prescribed by the Workers' Compensation Division of trfe Industrial
Commission. These policies will be in effect from inception until canceled by
filing with the commission or its designee a notification c>
j f cancellation on forms
prescribed by the Workers' Compensation Division within ten days after the
cancellation of a policy. Failure to notify the commission or its designee will
result in the continued liability of the carrier until the date that notice of
cancellation is received by the commission or its designee. Filings shall be
made within 30 days of the reinstatement of a policy, the changing or addition of
a name or address of the insured, or the merger of an insured with another
entity. All filings shall include the name of the insured, the principal business
address, any and all assumed name designations, the address of all locations
within this state where business is conducted, and after July 1,1987, all federal
employer identification numbers or federal tax identification numbers.
Noncompliance with the provisions of this section is grounds for revocation of
an insurance carrier's certificate of authority in addition to the grounds specified
in Title 31 A.
(2) The commission may assess an insurer up to $150, payable to the
Uninsured Employers' Fund, if the insurer fails to comply with the provisions of
this section.
35-1-57. Noncompliance - Penalty.
Employers who shall fail to comply with the provisions of §35-1-46 shall
not be entitled to the benefits of this title during the period of noncompliance, but
shall be liable in a civil action to their employees for damages suffered by
reason of personal injuries arising out of or in the course of employment caused
by the wrongful act, neglect or default of the employer or any of the employer's
officers, agents or employees, and also to the dependents of personal
representatives of such employees where death results from such injuries. In
any such action the defendant shall not avail himself of any of the following
defenses: the defense of the fellow-servant rule, the defense of assumption of
risk, or the defense of contributory negligence. Proof of the injury shall
constitute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the employer and
the burden shall be upon the employer to show freedom from negligence
resulting in such injury. And such employers shall also be subject to the
provisions of the two sections next succeeding [35-1-58, 35-1-59]. In any civil
action permitted under this section against the employer the employee shall be
entitled to necessary costs and a reasonable attorney fee assessed against the
employer.

